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EDDIE JAMES THOMAS, JR.,

JAMES BENEDETTI, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner,

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VS.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

Case No. 3:09-CV-00455-HDM-(RAM)

ORDER

Petitioner has submitted a third amended petition (#21). The court has reviewed it pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Petitioner will need to file a fourth amended petition to correct the defects.

Ground 1 is ostensibly a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A such, much of it is too vague to state a claim. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). "[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970). A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate (1) that the defense attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984), and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694.

"[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.

Petitioner alleges around eleven instances of ineffective assistance. Petitioner claims that counsel did not file any motions to suppress evidence or motions for discovery, but petitioner does not allege what evidence should have been suppressed or discovered. Petitioner claims that the trial transcript shows no evidence that the victim was investigated, such as either a psychological examination or a SAINT examination, but petitioner does not allege whether these examinations were actually conducted, nor whether the results of the examinations could have been admitted into evidence. Petitioner claims that counsel did not seek jury instructions on a lesser-included offense, but petitioner does not allege what that offense was. Petitioner claims that counsel never discussed plea negotiations with him, but then petitioner alleges that counsel told him that the prosecution would not negotiate; absent is any allegation that could show how counsel could have done anything else. Petitioner claims that counsel should have put forth a defense to the charges, but petitioner does not allege what that defense should have been.

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¹Petitioner does not define that term.

Indeed, other than alleging that the victim's testimony of virginity was not true and that counsel should have cross-examined the victim about it, petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition what evidence counsel should have presented to the jury.

Petitioner goes beyond claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in ground 1. He also appears to claim that insufficient evidence existed to support the jury's verdict. The court has explained to petitioner once before that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are distinct from underlying claims, and that the two claims need to be pleaded in separate grounds. See Kimmelmann v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-74 & n.1 (1986).

Petitioner will need to correct these defects in a fourth amended petition. Otherwise, the court will dismiss ground 1. Not all of the ground is defective, but petitioner has intertwined acceptable claims of ineffective assistance with defective claims. The court will not re-write ground 1 for petitioner, nor will the court expect respondents to pick out individual sentences to address.

Ground 2 contains multiple claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. First, the prosecution had sought to introduce evidence of petitioner's prior bad acts, and the trial court agreed after conducting a hearing pursuant to Petrocelli v.State, 692 P.2d 505 (Nev. 1985). Petitioner appealed that decision, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner argues that appellate counsel should not have raised the issue on appeal. Petitioner has not alleged any facts that appellate counsel's action caused him any prejudice. If appellate counsel did not appeal the district court's decision, nothing would have changed,

because the evidence of petitioner's prior bad acts still would have been admitted.

Second, petitioner claims that appellate counsel should have raised on appeal the issue that petitioner could have inquired about the victim's sexual history because she testified at trial that she was a virgin. However, in ground 1 petitioner alleges that his trial counsel never tried to present this evidence. If trial counsel did not try to introduce this evidence, then appellate counsel could not have appealed a ruling that never occurred, and appellate counsel neither performed deficiently nor caused petitioner any prejudice. Petitioner might be claiming that appellate counsel should have argued on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective, but in Nevada a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in a post-conviction petition, not on direct appeal. Gibbons v. State, 634 P.2d 1214 (Nev. 1981).

Third, when affirming the judgment of conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

We note that the district court did not provide the jury with a limiting instruction prior to the introduction of the [prior-bad-act] evidence, informing them that the evidence could not be considered to show criminal predisposition but only for the limited purposes allowable under NRS 48.045(2), because defense counsel objected to the State's proffered instruction and expressly requested, for tactical reasons, that the district court not provide such an instruction at that time. And Thomas does not allege on appeal that the jury was not properly instructed prior to deliberations.

Thomas v. State, No. 49486 (Nev. Dec. 10, 2007) (attached to first amended petition (#11) (footnote omitted). Petitioner appears to claim that appellate counsel should have raised on appeal the lack of a limiting instruction. Appellate counsel could not have appealed a ruling that petitioner, through trial counsel,

requested. The effectiveness of trial counsel in requesting no limiting instruction might be an issue, but appellate counsel could not have raised that issue on direct appeal. <u>Gibbons v. State</u>, 634 P.2d 1214 (Nev. 1981). Petitioner has not alleged any facts that could show deficient performance by counsel or prejudice.

Ground 3 has two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. First, petitioner claims that trial counsel should not have requested that the jury not be given a limiting instruction before the introduction of the prior-bad-act evidence. This part of ground 3 is acceptable. Second, petitioner cursorily alleges, "Counsel's failure to protect, preserve, and appeal all viable issues as federal claims violated petitioner's right to due process and effective assistance of counsel" This claim is too vague because petitioner does not allege what those issues are. Petitioner will need to correct that defect in the amended complaint.

Petitioner has filed another motion for appointment of counsel (#22), and respondents have filed an opposition (#24).

Nothing in the motion causes the court to depart from its denials of petitioner's earlier motions for appointment of counsel.

However, of note is this allegation in paragraph 4, page 2:

[Petitioner] has been recently informed that this second amended petition (#18) still contains mixed claims and the same defects which the court has ordered corrected. Thus, in order to comply with Court's Order (#17), Petitioner is now filing a "Third Amended" Petition along with this Motion for Appointment of Counsel to correct the deficiencies stated in Document #17.

Petitioner does not allege who told him that the second amended petition (#18) was defective, but it was not the court. To the contrary, the court found that the second amended petition (#18)

was acceptable and directed respondents to file a response to it.

Order (#19). Petitioner's third amended petition (#21) superseded
the second amended petition (#18), stopped respondents from filing
a response, and, as noted above, is filled with defects.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel (#22) is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court shall send Petitioner a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 form with instructions. Petitioner shall have thirty (30) days from the date that this order is entered in which to file a fourth amended petition to correct the noted deficiencies. Failure to comply with this order will result in the dismissal of grounds 1, 2, and part of 3.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner shall clearly title the fourth amended petition as such by placing the phrase "FOURTH AMENDED" immediately above "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254" on page 1 in the caption, and petitioner shall place the docket number, 3:09-CV-00455-HDM-(RAM), above the phrase "FOURTH AMENDED."

DATED: January 6, 2011.

Howard SMEKiller

HOWARD D. MCKIBBEN United States District Judge